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CRIMINAL JUDGMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES
The current and enlightened trend in the law of evidence seems
to be toward broader admissibility, based upon reasonableness and
common sense rather than strict rules from the past. A result of
this trend has been an occasional modification of the rule excluding
all prior criminal judgments in subsequent civil suits when the fact
of guilt is the precise fact sought to be proved by the offer of the
prior judgment. The rule of exclusion was the early law in both
England and the United States. Apparently England still follows the
rule,1 as do a majority of American jurisdictions; but inroads have
been made in this country, and it appears that strict exclusion is a
waning majority rule.
At present there are three different approaches used by the courts
when determining whether criminal judgments are admissible.
1. The conviction or acquittal is excluded altogether, which is the
present majority and traditional view.
2. The conviction is admitted as prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein, subject to rebuttal by contrary evidence. None of the
cases espousing this view give presumptive weight to acquittals.
3. The conviction is accepted as conclusive of the facts stated
therein, but this view has not been extended to acquittals. As a
further limitation, the cases have confined this conclusive approach
to a particular fact situation where the accused is seeking benefit
from the act for which he was convicted.
The courts following the latter two views have never suggested
that an acquittal be admitted so as to bar a subsequent civil action,
unless perhaps the object of the subsequent suit is in fact to punish
further the accused.! Acquittal in a criminal action merely means
that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the guilt of the accused. Such a strong measure of persuasion is not
required of the parties in a civil action, so the prior acquittal could
not reasonably be binding in the subsequent suit.
For a better understanding of the three approaches used by courts
today, each will be considered separately.
COMPLETE EXCLUSION
The rule of complete exclusion which had its foundation in the
'Hollington v. Hewthorn and Co. [19431 1 K.B. 587. The facts of this case are dis-
cussed in the text, infra.
aHelvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). This case involved forfeiture in a civil
action, and permitted the acquittal to be used on the grounds that punishment in the
second proceeding would be double jeopardy.
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early common law decisions is based on the theory that any judgment
of conviction or acquittal is a decision in rem which estops the whole
world from attacking the fact of conviction or acquittal but estops
only the parties from afterwards raising the question whether the
accused was in fact guilty or innocent. Therefore in a subsequent
civil action one may, after having been convicted of a crime, assert
his innocence and put his opponent to the proof of guilt. The doc-
trine of res inter alios acta - the issues of the proceeding are not
identical - has been held applicable.'
The English courts still seem to follow this exclusion theory, as
indicated by the recent case of Hollington v. Hewthorn." However,
the fact situation in this case was not one which lent itself to the
adoption of one of the more modern rules. The crime was a minor
one involving vehicles, and traffic violation convictions may lack
necessary probative value in a subsequent civil suit. Nevertheless,
the complete exclusion rule was followed, and as a basis for the rule
the English court gave the following reasons: (1) such evidence is
not relevant, but is only the view of another court on the evidence,
such evidence being unknown to the civil court; (2) res inter alios
acta - the issues of the two proceedings are not identical; (3) the
evidence would be hearsay, having been made outside of the civil
proceeding and being offered as proof of the statements made there-
in; (4) evidence is only the opinion of the criminal court; (5) if
the conviction should be admissible, acquittal should also be ad-
missible, which has never been suggested.
These five arguments cover the most frequently stated reasons
given in support of the exclusion rule.
1. In answer to the relevancy argument it may be said that rele-
vant should mean logically probative, and a conviction in the or-
dinary criminal trial of the same offense in issue at a subsequent
civil trial would be logically probative.
2. The answer to the res inter alios acta claim is that even if the
issues are not identical, the accused has had sufficient opportunity
to defend himself in a proceeding in which he was given more pro-
tection than he would receive in the civil trial. Any differences as
to elements of proof, degree of proof, weight of evidence, or com-
petency of witnesses are resolved in favor of the accused in the crim-
'This is illustrated by the language in Leyman v. Latimer. 3 Ex. D. 352, 354 (1878):
"It is plain . . . that a conviction for felony is res inter alios acta, and of itself is no
evidence in any civil proceeding that the person convicted has committed a felony."
4 [1943] 1 K.B. 587.
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inal trial. Therefore, there seems to be no prejudice of accused's rights
in admitting the prior judgment.
3 & 4. The hearsay and opinion arguments apparently overlook
the recognized exceptions to these rules. Such exceptions fully justify
admission of a judgment of conviction in a subsequent civil action.
Official documents are a recognized exception to the hearsay rule'
and there is no reason why the judgment could not be under the
official document classification.'
5. As for the conviction-acquittal distinction, conviction indi-
cates that the accused has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt; acquittal simply means the prosecution has not met the re-
quirement of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The majority of American jurisdictions still follow the complete
exclusion rule.7 It has been held, for example, that in an action on
a life insurance policy, the record of the beneficiary's conviction of
manslaughter for killing the insured was inadmissible, notwithstand-
ing a statute precluding such a beneficiary from receiving the pro-
ceeds of the policy.' Another case in direct conflict with the more
modern authorities refused to admit a conviction of the insured for
arson, and held that the guilt of the insured must be proved de
novo.9
Texas courts have consistently followed this narrow rule of ex-
clusion.1" They have failed to make any distinction between acquittal
and conviction, 1 either type of judgment being excluded. In Stewart
v. Profit,"2 an action in trespass to try title where the issue was
whether a grantor was a white woman or a Negress, it was held that
her conviction of marrying a Negro, she being a white woman, was
not admissible in evidence. The case of Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia
v. Coomer" involved conviction of arson and the subsequent pro-
ceeding by the accused to collect insurance because of the fire. The
court held that while the conviction might be introduced for the
purpose of impeaching the insured's credibility as a witness, the
55 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 512 (3d ed. 1940).
6 id. at 844, 845.
'Id. at 687. See, e.g., Interstate Dry Goods v. Williamson, 91 W.Va. 156, 112 S.E. 301
(1922); Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Clement, 192 Ark. 371, 91 S.W.2d 265 (1936);
State v. Fitzgerald, 140 Me. 314, 37 A.2d 799 (1944); and Commonwealth v. McMenamin,
122 Pa. Super. 91, 184 Atl. 679 (1936).
'Goodwin v. Continental Cas. Co., 175 Okla. 469, 53 P.2d 241 (1939).
'Girard v. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 103 Vt. 330, 154 Atl. 666 (1931).
'°MCCORMICK AND RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE, S 1279 (2d ed. 1956).
" Smith v. White, 216 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.
1' 146 S.W. 563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) error ref.
13158 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
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judgment was not evidence that the loss was caused by insured, since
the insurer was in no way a party to the criminal proceeding.
There are many Texas cases holding that an acquittal in a criminal
prosecution will not affect a subsequent civil suit, the record of the
criminal prosecution being inadmissible as evidence of the accused's
innocence.'
PRIMA FACIE RULE
Under the prima facie rule the record of conviction in the criminal
case is admissible in the subsequent civil case as prima facie evidence
of the facts stated therein, thereby shifting the burden of disproving
such facts to the accused.
The leading case giving a criminal judgment such presumptive
force in a subsequent civil suit is Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co.,"5 a
New York case. The conviction was used defensively by the insur-
ance company to prevent enforcement of what amounted to a re-
imbursement for the commission of a crime. Whether this presump-
tion would extend to cases where the accused is a defendant has not
been settled by the Court of Appeals in New York; the lower courts
are in conflict."6
The prima facie theory recognizes the probative value of prior
judicial determinations. As stated in Sovereign Camp W.O.W. v.
Gunn," "To say all this is no evidence at all of [the accused's] guilt
when that exact issue is presented again in a civil suit, is to say the
same tribunals which conduct such proceedings shall give them no
probative force in civil actions on technical grounds of want of mu-
tuality. To so hold is to discredit solemn judicial findings in the
forum of their rendition."
Possible arguments against this presumptive rule could be sum-
marized as follows: (1) there is a difference in parties in the two
suits; (2) there are variation in rules of evidence including com-
petency of witnesses and degrees of proof; (3) it is questionable
whether or not the average jury is able to comprehend the concep-
14Landa v. Obert, 78 Tex. 33, 14 S.W. 297 (1890); Simpson v. City of Houston,
260 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.; Pittman v. Stephans, 153 S.W.2d
314 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error ref. w.o.in.
15258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932). Plaintiff sued on an insurance policy for fire
loss. Defendant insurance company set up the fraud of plaintiff as a defense, i.e., plaintiff
had made false statement of loss and damage, and was convicted of presenting false and
fraudulent proof of loss.
" Walther v. News Syndicate Co., 276 App. Div. 169, 93 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1st Dep't
1949); Stanton v. Major, 274 App. Div. 864, 82 N.Y.S.2d 134 (3d Dep't 1948); Giessler
v. Accurate Brass Co., 271 App. Div. 980, 68 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2d Dep't 1947); Same v.
Davison, 253 App. Div. 123, 1 N.Y.S.2d 374 (4th Dep't 1937).
17227 Ala. 400, 150 So. 491 (1933).
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tion of a conviction as being merely prima facie evidence. The dif-
ference of parties is of no material significance since the conviction
will only be used against the original defendant who had an oppor-
tunity in the criminal trial to fully litigate the same issue involved
in the civil case. As to variations in evidence, it has been pointed out
in discussing the complete exclusion rule that all variations in evi-
dence are in favor of the accused in the criminal trial. Finally, it
seems doubtful that the jury would be less able to comprehend the
presumptive force of the conviction than to comprehend the meaning
of "preponderance of evidence" or "beyond a reasonable doubt."
With proper instructions the problem would be minimized.
The only difference between the prima facie rule and the con-
clusive rule is the weight to be attached to the prior judgment. The
presumptive weight applied to the former rule is justified in the
Gunn case in the following language: "Since another party to civil
suit, in no way bound by the results of the prosecution, is offering
such record, the other party should not be entirely concluded and
shut off from showing there was a miscarriage of justice in the
criminal case."' 8 A practical application of this reasoning appeared
in North River Ins. Co. v. Militello." On re-trial of the civil case,
judgment was for the accused,0 so although he was in prison at the
time for the offense, he was still permitted to recover from the in-
surance company for the very act for which he had been convicted.
CONCLUSIVE RULE
The conclusive rule is generally applied defensively when the ac-
cused is seeking reimbursement for the very loss which he caused
through the commission of the crime. The leading case setting forth
this theory is Eagle Star and British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller."
The court held that the criminal judgment was determinative unless
proof of fraud or some other ground of invalidity could be shown.
But there is a question whether the Heller doctrine would apply if
the convicted person were a defendant in a civil case, and failure
to use the judgment would not result in unjust enrichment. The court
emphasized that this holding applied only to these facts, and no
opinion was expressed as to the case of a personal injury action fol-
lowing a criminal conviction for the acts causing such injury. If
the accused were not seeking unjust enrichment, public policy con-
150 So. at 493 (1933).
'9100 Colo. 343, 67 P.2d 625 (1937).
20104 Colo. 28, 88 P.2d 567 (1939).
21 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927).
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siderations would no longer be present. Even in Virginia, where the
Heller decision was handed down, it does not appear that conclusive
effect would be given in other situations. 2
Wigmore seems to favor the conclusive doctrine, observing that
in many situations it is "unreasonable and impractical to ignore the
evidential use of a judgment in another proceeding involving the
same fact as in the present case.""
Two other cases in support of this view are worthy of note. The
first, Poston v. Home Ins. Co., 4 held that conviction would be con-
clusive against one charged with theft of his own automobile and with
using the mails to defraud in the filing of proof of loss under a policy
against theft, since the court would not look with favor upon the
right of a party to profit by his own criminal act. Here again the
public policy argument controlled. In Austin v. United States" the
facts were similar, and the court said, "We think no error was com-
mitted in holding the judgment was conclusive on the plaintiff." In
arguing in favor of this view it may be said that it is more logical,
in that where the conviction is not given conclusive effect there is
danger either that the jury will give it such weight as to make it an
irrebuttable presumption; or at the other extreme, it will be dis-
regarded and directly contradicted. If the conviction is given con-
clusive weight, subject to discretion by the court as to whether the
issue in the pending civil action was fully and fairly litigated and
determined in the previous criminal trial, the accused is actually af-
forded protection equal to that under the prima facie rule. The dis-
cretionary element would eliminate the problem of evidence of minor
convictions, because they would not in most cases pass the test of
being fully litigated.
SUGGESTED LEGISLATION
Both the Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence have considered this problem, and have set forth proposed
rules. The Model Code has suggested the broader rule: "Evidence of
a subsisting judgment adjudging a person guilty of a crime or mis-
demeanor is admissible as tending to prove the facts recited therein
and every fact essential to sustain the judgment."'" In the comment
following the rule, the Code recognizes that most courts reject such
evidence, but states that when the accused has been found guilty
"Anderson v. Sisson, 170 Va. 178, 196 S.E. 688 (1938).
"5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 688 (3d ed. 1940).
24 191 S.C. 314, 4 S.E.2d 261 (1939).
25 125 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1942).
"
8MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 521 (1942).
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beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict has sufficient value to be con-
sidered by the civil court, and necessarily includes a finding of all
facts essential to sustain the judgment in the particular case.
The Uniform Rules provide a rule which would probably be ac-
cepted more readily by the courts, i.e., the admission of "evidence
of a final judgment adjudging a person guilty of a felony to prove
any facts essential to sustain the judgment." (emphasis added)7
Misdemeanors are excluded because they are less trustworthy, espe-
cially traffic violations when used to prove negligence.
CONCLUSION
The traditional rule of exclusion, although still the majority rule,
is being modified and changed in an ever increasing number of
jurisdictions. The forms this modification takes are varied, usually
depending on the fact situation involved. Where public policy in-
terest is strong, as in cases of unjust enrichment, the criminal judg-
ment has been held conclusive in the civil suit; but when the court
fears to take such a broad step a presumption is given to the prior
judgment which shifts the burden of proof. It is submitted that
either approach is an improvement over the exclusion rule, and that
with proper procedural safeguards protecting the accused in case of
a fraudulent criminal judgment, the conclusive rule would tender
the more satisfactory results. Since our criminal trials now offer an
accused a maximum protection of his rights, the need for the ex-
clusion rule has disappeared, and common sense calls for the ad-
mission of prior judgments when the same issue is again being
litigated.
Thomas H. Davis IV
U' irwow RULES oF EVIDENCE rule 63 § 20 (1950).
[Vol. I11
